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Abstract
Introduction: In western countries the transmission of hepatitis B virus (HBV) transmission through multi-patients lancing
devices has been inferred since early ‘90s, however no study has ever provided biological evidence which directly link these
device with HBV cross-infection. Here we present results of an outbreak investigation which could associate, by molecular
techniques, the use of lancing device on multiple patients with HBV transmission in an Italian oncohematology unit.
Methods: The outbreak investigation was designed as a retrospective cohort study to identify all potential cases. All cases
identified were eventually confirmed through molecular epidemiology techniques. Audit of personnel including extensive
review of infection control measures and reviewing personnel’s tests for HBV was done identify transmission route.
Results: Between 4 May 2006 and 21 February 2007, six incident cases of HBV infection were reported among 162 patients
admitted in the oncohematology. The subsequent molecular instigation proved that 3 out 6 incident cases and one
prevalent cases (already infected with HBV at the admission) represented a monophyletic cluster of infection. The eventual
environmental investigation found that an identical HBV viral strain was present on a multi-patients lancing device in use in
the unit and the inferential analysis showed a statistically significant association between undergoing lancing procedures
and the infection.
Discussion: This investigation provide molecular evidence to link a HBV infection cluster to multi-patients lancing device and
highlights that patients undergoing capillary blood sampling by non-disposable lancing device may face an unacceptable
increased risk of HBV infection. Therefore we believe that multi-patients lancing devices should be banned from healthcare
settings and replace with disposable safety lancets that permanently retract to prevent the use of the same device on multiple
patients. The use of non-disposable lancing devices should be restricted to individual use at patients’ home.
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Introduction
In western countries cross infections of hepatitis B virus (HBV)
have been mainly reported as a consequence of failure to apply
standard measures for infection control [1]. In 2009 we published a
systematicreviewincluding33HBVoutbreakswhichoccurredinEU
and USA healthcare settings (HCS) [2] and we found that the use of
multi-patient lancing devices for capillary blood sampling was the
second most frequent route of HBV transmission after multi-use drug
vials; similar findings were also reported by a similar review published
in the same year [3]. In fact, the role of multi-patient lancing devices
in HBV transmission has been inferred since early ‘90s [2,4–6],
however no study has ever provided biological evidence to link multi-
patient lancing devices with HBV cross infection.
During February 2007 3 cases of acute HBV infection occurred in
a single Italian oncohematology unit over less than 2 months. On
March 2007, the INMI-Lazzaro Spallanzani (INMI) epidemiology
team was asked to investigate the event and, if epidemic cluster(s)
were confirmed, to identify and remove potential causes. This report
presents the results of the outbreak investigation, which provide
molecular evidence to link the use of a single multi-patient lancing
device to the transmission of HBV within the oncohematology unit.
The report has been written according to the ORION statement [7].
Materials and Methods
Ethical statement
All data contained in the manuscript are obtained during the
epidemiological investigation performed in order to identify/
contain an ongoing epidemic cluster among frail subjects, to
provide recommendations, to prevent new outbreaks and to avert
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publication there was no information that could identify the
patient personally.
The approval of INMI Spallanzani’s IRB was not required since
we operated under emergency circumstance (i.e.: potential risk of
death of already infected subjects due to complications and the risk
of further spreading of the infection) and patients never underwent
individual intervention for the purposes of this study but only
according to their needs and clinical judgment. Individual written
consents was obtained for all subjects who were included in the
case-control and/or provided biological specimen(s) provided that
they were still alive when specimen(s) were obtained.
Study Design
Based on HBV’s incubation period and the time of infection
onset, we define a historical cohort to include all patients who had
been admitted to the oncohematology unit between 4 May 2006
and 21 February 2007. In addition, a prospective surveillance
period was performed between march 2007 and march 2008 (see
table 1) to confirm the end of the transmission.
To assessed the statistical association between potential risk
factors and HBV infection we carried out a case control study
nested into the historical cohort (i.e. nested case control study).
Case finding was performed by reviewing clinical charts, testing
patients’ biological specimens preserved in the hospital and testing
living patients at least 6 months after their last admission to
oncohematology unit.
Molecular epidemiology techniques were used to confirm cases.
Definitions
Pre-admission HBV-status. Susceptible: a patient testing
negative for anti-HBcAg and/or anti-HBsAg markers at any time
after the first admission to oncohematology unit.
Non-susceptible: a patient who, before first admission or within
14 days after first admission to oncohematology unit, tested either:
a) Previously infected: anti-HBcAg and/or HBVDNA and/or
HBsAg positive;
b) Vaccinated: anti-HBsAg positive and anti-HBcAg negative.
Undefined: a patient who was never tested.
Case definition. Prevalent case: a case who was already
admitted as previously infected.
Incident case: a case who was susceptible at pre-admission and
eventually became previously infected.
Index case: a prevalent case infected with a HBV molecular
variant identical to confirmed case(s).
Confirmed case: an incident case infected with a HBV
molecular variant identical to the index case.
Suspect case: an incident case for whom a HBV molecular
variant was not defined.
Excluded cases:
a) all patients ‘‘non-susceptible’’ at pre-admission apart form
index case(s);
b) all patients who were susceptible/vaccinated at least 6
months after the last admission to oncohematology unit;
c) all patients who were infected with a HBV molecular variant
different from the variant(s) infecting confirmed/index case(s).
Not assessable: all patients who did not meet any of the above
definitions.
Setting
The outbreak occurred in a medium size public general hospital
(about 750 beds). The investigation involved 3 hospital units
including.
1. The oncohematology unit used to care for patients with and
without cancer, was capable of autologous hematopoietic stem
cell transplant and could accommodate a maximum of 18
patients in 7 rooms (3 of which were single-bedded).
Table 1. Shows all the interventions performed to contain the spreading of the infection either by hospital authority before the
INMI’s involvement or undertaken by INMI epi-team its-self.
Institution responsible for the activity Type of Activity Date
Local health authority Deferral of HSC autografts 1 March to 1 April 2007
Map of blood donor 10 March 2007
INMI’s Epi-team Acquisition of data about all interventions already undertaken 10 March 2007
Timing meeting between hospital authority and epi-team
(5 meeting held)
10 March to 22 June 2007
Test of all HSC unit to restart autografts 15–20 March 2007
Auditing: Interview of medical heads of OHU, TMU and IRU 10–15 March 2007
Auditing: Interview of OHU’s nurse and nurse coordinator 19–23 March 2007
Auditing: Acquisition of internal protocol
in use in OHU, TMU and IRU
15 march 2007
Auditing: Review of HCW’s HBV testing April 2007
Environmental inspection in OHU 2 April 2007
Environmental inspection in TMU 15 March 2007
Implementation of a enhanced survey to detect new cases of HBV
infection
March 2007–March 2008
Educational event on blood-borne infection
(2 days course for OHU’s HCW)
14–15 June 2007
INMI=National Institute for Infectious diseases; HSC=hematopoietic stem cells; HBV=hepatitis B virus; HCW=healthcare workers; OHU=onco-hematology unit;
TMU=transfusion medicine unit; IRU=interventional radiology unit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033122.t001
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and provided the oncohematology unit with transfusion and
hematopoietic stem cell apheresis/transplant service.
3. The interventional radiology unit consisted in an operating
theatre with dedicated personnel within the radio-diagnostic
department. Patients admitted to oncohematology unit used to
be sent to the interventional radiology whenever they needed
central venous catheter insertion.
Interventions
When the epidemiology team was formally involved in the
investigation several interventions had already been undertaken by
local authority. Table 1 reports the time-table of interventions
undertaken before and after the formal initiation of the
investigation.
By mid March 2007, one-year enhanced surveillance for viral
hepatitis for one year was implemented. This consisted in testing
all patients admitted to oncohematology unit for anti-HBsAg, anti-
HBcAg and HBsAg at admission and whenever they showed signs
of acute hepatitis (i.e. ALT.80 UI). A serum sample was sent to
INMI for all patients positive for HBsAg. Audit was carried out to
identify and remove potential gaps in infection control measures.
All internal protocols were assessed and oncohematology unit’s
nurses were interviewed using a predefined form, while the
medical heads of all the three units were informally asked about
the general procedures of their own unit. The potential role of
HCW-to-patient transmission was evaluated by reviewing HCW’s
tests for HBV, as preformed annually. An environmental
investigation was conducted to evaluate the role of the environ-
ment in the spreading of HBV. The Oncohematology unit and the
transfusion medicine unit were inspected and environmental
samples were obtained. In addition we assessed (by direct
observation) the actual implementation of infection control
measures as reported in the internal protocols.
Virology
HBV serology and HBV-DNA testing. Standard serum
samples: HBsAg, anti-HBsAg, and total anti-HBcAg were
evaluated using quantitative enzyme immunoassay (Axsym,
Abbott Diagnostics, Wiesbaden, Germany). HBV DNA was
measured using Cobas Ampliprep/Cobas TaqMan HBV assay
(Roche Diagnostics, Basel, Switzerland).
Lancing Device: the internal and external surfaces of the multi-
patient lancing device was washed with heat inactivated fetal calf
serum and the elute was eventually tested for HBV DNA by Cobas
Ampliprep/Cobas TaqMan.
Liver biopsies: paraffin was removed using a progression of
xylene and ethanol washes [8] and homogenized tissue was
processed by QIAamp DNA Minikit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Ger-
many). The extracted DNA was tested for HBV-DNA presence.
Bone marrow: HBV-DNA from bone marrow was extracted
using QIAamp minikit (QIAGEN, Hilden, Germany) and
employed for HBV DNA detection.
Blood samples derived from apheresis: plasma was separated
from PMBCs by centrifugation, screened for HBsAg, total anti-
HBcAg and, if positive, HBV-DNA molecular testing was
performed.
Cryopreservation tank: detritus was collected and allowed to
thaw. The extracts were tested for HBV DNA detection.
Molecular analysis of HBV DNA. Amplification of two
region of HBV viral genome were performed as previously
described [9–10]; this is the polymerases and the core/precore
regions. In particular, 558 nucleotides (nucleotides 345–902) and
562 nucleotides (nucleotides 1794–2355) were sequenced for
polymerase and core promoter/precore gene respectively. The
nucleotide numbers are in accordance with a genotype D HBV
isolate of 3182 nucleotides [AB205127]. Surface region of HBV
extracted from the multi-patients device was cloned into the donor
vector of the Gateway cloning system (Life Technologies)
according to manufacturer’s instruction. PCR-amplified HBV-
DNA and seven randomly selected clones were sequenced directly
on the automated ABI Prism 3100 sequencer, using the BigDye
Terminator cycle sequencing kit (Applied Biosystems, Warrington,
UK). Phylogenetic trees were constructed using the neighbor-
joining method, including HBV reference sequences from
GenBank, as well as sequences of genotype D obtained from
routine Laboratory samples. All the algorithms used are included
in the Mega package (version 2.1). The results of this analysis were
used to confirm a monophyletic cluster of infection. Bootstrap
analysis with 1,000 replications was performed to assess the
significance of the nodes; values .85% were considered to be
significant. The sequence data from the current report have been
submitted GenBank with the accession numbers–JQ403585–
JQ403598 (polymerase region sequence) andJQ403599–
JQ403606(core/precore sequence).
Statistical methods
Statistical association was studied by a nested case control study.
Cases were all subjects who met the definition of ‘‘incident case’’
and controls were all subjects who tested negative for anti-HBcAg
6 months after the end of the last admission. The list of potential
risk factors was defined according to published data [2] and the
results of the audit. This is: gender (binary variable); age (in years,
continuous variable); being admitted for cancer (binary variable);
having underwent hematopoietic stem cell apheresis and/or
transplant (binary variable), having underwent any kind of surgery
since the first admission (binary variable); having received blood
transfusion while admitted (binary variable); having had at least
one day of central venous catheterization while admitted (binary
variable); median exposure to multi-patient lancing device while
admitted with the index case and either until the onset of acute
hepatitis or the first positive anti-HBcAg test (in days, continuous
variable). Diagnosis of acute hepatitis was according to clinical
records (i.e. clinical diagnosis of acute hepatitis eventually
confirmed by laboratory test, as reported in patients’ charts).
Association of the outcome to binary variables was assessed with
Fisher’s test; relative odds ratio (OR), 95% confidence intervals
(95%-CI) and p-values were provided. Association of the outcome
to continuous variables was assessed with the Mann-Whitney U
test and relative medians values, inter-quartiles ranges (IQR) and
p-values were provided.
Analysis was performed using Stata Statistical software, version
11.2 (StataCorp, Texas, USA).
Results
Cohort study and nested case control
Between 4 May 2006 and 21 February 2007 the oncohematol-
ogy unit performed a total of 272 admissions on 162 individual
patients. We could define the HBV pre-admission status for 83 out
of 162 patients; of these 33 were non-susceptible (including 3
HBsAg positive prevalent cases) and 50 were susceptible. No
information about HBV were available for the other 79 patients
(58 died before start of investigation, 21 were lost, 6 refused to
provide serum samples). Among the 50 patients susceptible at
admission, 6 incident cases were identified (3 HBsAg positive, 2
HBV Transmission by Lancing Device
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positive).
Two out 3 prevalent cases and 3 out 6 incident cases underwent
molecular investigation to type HBV variant. The characterization
of the HBV molecular variants (figure 1) showed that one
prevalent cases (index case; code CC-0 in figure 1 and table 2) and
3 incident cases (confirmed cases; code CC-1, CC-2, CC-3 in
figure 1 and table 2) were infected with an identical HBV variant.
The other prevalent case was infected with an unrelated HBV
variant (excluded case; code CE-58 in figure 1). As the genotype D
is the most prevalent among HBsAg positive subjects in Italy, to
increase discriminatory power of the molecular investigation, we
produced a subsequent phylogenetic tree using 214 HBV-
polymerases genomic sequence from unrelated subjects obtained
during routine clinical practice. Even after this extended analysis
CC-0, CC-1, CC-2, CC-3 and the elute from mp-LD formed a
monophyletic cluster distinct from the other sequences by very
high bootstrap value (figure 2).
One prevalent case refused to provide serum sample and was no
further investigated. Three incident cases did not underwent molecular
investigation either because are already anti-HBsAg positive or had
undetectable HBV DNA (suspect cases CD-4, CD-5, CD-6 in table 2).
Figure 1. Phylogenetic tree of HBV-precore/core and HBV-polymerase region. The analysis was performed on 3 out 6 incident cases, 2 out
3 prevalent cases, 2 additional cases identified during the enhanced surveillance period and on elute from the mp-LD (red codes). The phylogenetic
trees also include 10 (precore/core) and 13 (polymerase) sequences of the genotype D HBV from patients not related to the outbreak who were
referred to the laboratory for diagnostic purpose (black codes) and 3 genotype D sequences from GenBank (blue codes). The analysis shows that all
patients within the study were infected with a genotype D HBV. In addition one prevalent cases (index case; CC-0), 3 incident cases (confirmed cases;
CC-1, CC-2 and CC-3) and the elute from multi-patients lancing device (mp-LD) where infected with a highly related HBV molecular variant. In fact,
these molecular variants form a monophyletic cluster distinct from the other sequences by very high bootstrap value (red box). In contrast one
prevalent case (excluded case CE-58) and the 2 cases (excluded cases; CE-55 and CE-77) detected during the enhanced surveillance were infected
with unrelated HBV molecular variants. The epidemiologically unrelated cases, both form our laboratory archive and from GenBanK, were infected
with genetically distant variants as expected. Boxes indicate the epidemic cluster; the bars indicate the genetic distance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033122.g001
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cases met and underwent capillary blood sampling along with the
index case. In addition the results of the nested case control study
including the 50 susceptible patients (6 cases and 44 controls)
provided good evidence of association between the duration of
exposure to multi-patient lancing device while admitted with the
index case and being an incident case (table 3).
Enhanced surveillance
Three further cases of HBsAg sero-conversion were found
between March 2007 and March 2008 (2 had already been tested
anti-HBcAg positive at admission and 1 had never been tested
before). HBV molecular characterization was done for 2 of them
as one prevalent case had a low HBV DNA load (116 UI) which
did not allow typing. The results of molecular investigation showed
that both patients were infected with unrelated HBV variants (CE-
77 and CE-55 in figure 1).
Audit
The oncohematology unit was staffed with 15 nurses on 3
different shifts; no HCW was exclusively assigned to single bed
rooms. Analysis of protocol showed that no formal surveillance was
implemented to screen newly admitted patients for HBV. Some
nurses reported they had occasionally shared 100 ml 0.9% NaCl
solutions for medication of central venous catheter insertion sites
until the onset of HBV cases. Nurses claimed they consistently
washed hands and used a new pair of gloves whenever they
approached a new patient. All interviewed HCWs confirmed that a
single shared multi-patient lancing device (figure 3) was in use, we
discouraged thispractice and obtained the device for testing. HCWs
claimed to use the device according to the user’s guide as provided
by the manufacturer; we consulted the 2007 release of the user’s
guide [11] which reported that useof thedevice on multiple patients
was allowed provided that both the end-cap and the lancet were
changed for each subsequent patient to be sampled.
The audit in the transfusion medicine unit revealed that the unit
was provided with adequate protocols for environmental cleaning
and patient management. Hematopoietic stem cell aphereses/
transplants were performed by transfusion medicine unit personnel
at patients’ beds in the oncohematology unit. The Hematopoietic
stem cell were sent immediately after collection to transfusion
medicine unit to be manipulated in a dedicated room provided
with a fume hood, and eventually stored in another room in a
liquid nitrogen cryo-tank. The apheresis machine in use was
provided with single-use external circuits which prevents contact
with patient’s blood and the structural components. The apheresis
machine was stored and maintained by nurses in a dedicated
room.
The assessment of all interventional radiology unit’s protocols/
procedures and the informal interviews with nurse coordinator
and the head of the unit confirmed that interventional radiology
unit operate according to high infection control standards as
required for surgical units.
The results of HCWs’ tests annually performed showed that no
HCW had tested HBsAg positive between 2006 and 2007 nor had
they reported signs or symptoms of acute hepatitis after being
tested.
Environmental investigation
Local inspection of oncohematology unit and transfusion
medicine unit confirmed all primary audit findings. According to
published data and audit results we decided to search for HBV-
DNA on liquid nitrogen contained in the cryo-tank and on the
multi-patient lancing device which had been used in the
oncohematology unit for at least 1 year. Tests of the liquid
nitrogen failed to find evidence of HBV-DNA. In contrast, the
analysis preformed on multi-patient lancing device showed that
this device was contaminated with a HBV molecular variant
identical to the one which had been found infecting both the index
case and the confirmed incident cases (Figure 1).
Table 2. Shows main clinical feature of incident case (CCs codes are for confirmed and case CDs codes are for suspected cases).
Case’s features CC-0 CC-1 CC-2 CC-3 CD-4 CD-5 CD-6
Case definition index confirmed confirmed confirmed potential potential potential
HBV molecular variant NT NT NT
S e x M FM FFM M
Age in years 66 58 71 40 80 52 56
Diagnosis MM MM NHL NHL AML MM NHL
First admission 11/05/06 08/07/06 22/05/06 09/05/06 21/10/06 18/09/06 08/11/06
Last negative anti-HBcAg none [a] 10/10/06 14/07/06 01/01/07 23/10/06 01/04/07 08/11/06
First positive anti-HBcAg none [a] 15/01/07 12/02/07 01/03/07 15/01/08 [b] 12/05/08 [b] 09/10/07 [b]
Days of Exposure to
mp-LD
1 5 9 2 83 13 51 53 3 1
Transfusion No No Yes [c] No Yes [c] No No
Surgery Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HSC autograft Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
CVC Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
M=male; F=female; MM=multiple myeloma; NHL=non-Hodgkin lymphoma; AML=acute myeloid leukemia; mp-LD=multi-patients lancing device,
HSC=hematopoietic stem cells; CVC=central venous catheter.
a) Positive before the first admission.
b) Patient never reported symptoms of acute hepatitis and were found to be positive during test performed 6 months after the last admission to oncohematology unit.
c) No common donor between patients was found.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033122.t002
HBV Transmission by Lancing Device
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 March 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 3 | e33122Discussion
The evidence collected throughout the investigation suggests
that one patient, already known to be a HBsAg carrier (index
case), transmitted HBV infection to 3, and potentially 6, other
patients, (i.e.: 3 confirmed case and 3 suspect cases). The
transmission was likely to occur as the consequence of cross
infection through a shared multi-patient lancing device which was
habitually used in the oncohematology to sample patients while
admitted.
Several pieces of evidence support this hypothesis. Firstly, all 6
incident cases were admitted with the index case at least once
between 4 May 2006 and 21 February 2007. Secondly, the index
case and the 6 cases were sampled by a single multi-patient lancing
device (this was the only device the nurses claim to be in use in the
ward). Thirdly, the case control study showed that the median
time of exposure to multi-patient lancing device while susceptible
and admitted with the index case was significantly longer in cases
than in controls. Fourthly, no more cases occurred after removal
the multi-patient lancing device. Finally, the index case and 3
confirmed incident cases were infected with an identical HBV
molecular variant which was eventually found on the multi-patient
lancing device, while other coincidentally sampled cases revealed
different molecular variants.
We hypothesize that the infections may have occurred by one or
more of the following mechanisms: a) failure in changing the
lancet, b) failure in changing the end-cap, c) infection of a new
lancet occurred as consequence of contamination of the lancet
holder (e.g.: blood spilling over into lancet holder; see figure 3 for
multi-patient lancing device details).
Alternative transmission routes seemed to be unlikely. Trans-
mission by transfusion was excluded since no common donor was
found between cases, indeed only 2 out 6 cases had been
transfused. Moreover, the risk of HBV infection through
transfusion is exceedingly low in Italy due to: strict controls on
the units to be transfused [12] and the progressive reduction of
HBsAg prevalence in healthy adults due to compulsory anti-HBV
vaccination since 1992 [13]. Potential transmission through
contaminated autologous hematopoietic stem cell, as described
by Tedder et al [14], was ruled out by molecular investigation on
Figure 2. Extended phylogenetic analysis for HBV polymerase region. Extended phylogenetic tree including 214 genomic sequence of HBV-
polymerase region. In red unrelated HBV molecular variant which were obtained from patients referred to our laboratory in about 7 years. In black: 3
genotype D sequences from GenBank (AB205127; AB116266; X97848); 3 excluded case form our investigation (CE-55_1/2; CE-58; CE-77); The index
case (CC-0); 3 confirmed cases (CC-1; CC-2; CC-3); the elute form multi-patients lancing device (mp-LD). Even after this new analysis CC-0, CC-1, CC-2,
CC-3 and the elute from mp-LD formed a monophyletic cluster distinct from the other sequences by very high bootstrap value. The box indicates the
epidemic cluster; the bars indicate the genetic distance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033122.g002
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[ref. 8].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033122.g003
Table 3. Nested case control study for analysis of association between being incident case and potential risk-factor.
Risk factors Case (n=6) Control (n=44) OR (95%CI) P-value
Gender (%) [a] male 32 0 1
female 3 24 1.20 (0.14–9.95) 1.0000
Cancer (%) [a] yes 63 7 1
no 0 7 na 0.5760
HSCT (%) [a] yes 41 4 1
no 2 30 4.29 (0.52–51.04) 0.1710
Surgery (%) [a] yes 63 4 1
no 0 10 na 0.3271
Transfusion (%) [a] yes 27 1
no 4 37 2.64 (0.20–22.58) 0.2629
CVC (%) [a] yes 42 2 1
no 2 22 2.00 (0.25–23.94) 0.6688
Median age (IQR) [b] 57 (52–72) 66 (52.5–73) - 0.7088
Median exposure to mp-LD (IQR) [b-c] 29.5 (15–31) 0 (0–11) - 0.0102
Overall - 6 44 - -
All the 50 susceptible patients enrolled in the historical cohort (i.e. patients admitted to oncohematology unit between 4 May 2006 and 21 February 2007) were
included in the risk analysis. Case were all patients defined as ‘‘incident cases’’ while control were all patients still ‘‘susceptible’’ $6 months after their last admission to
the oncohematology unit. The results of the risk analysis provided good evidence of association between the time of exposure to multi-patient lancing devicewhile
admitted with the index case and the HBV infections.
OR=odds ration; 95%CI=95% confidence interval; mp-LD=multi-patients lancing device, HSCT=hematopoietic stem cells transplant; CVC=central venous
catheter; na=not any, Fisher confidence levels not possible with zero count cells (all cases were exposed).
a) 95%CI and p-value according to Fisher’s exact test.
b) p-value according to Mann–Whitney U test.
c) This represents patients’ median exposure (in days) to multi-patient lancing device while admitted with the index case and until the onset of acute hepatitis or the
first positive test for HBV.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0033122.t003
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HCW was found to be HBsAg positive [15]. Other potential risk
factors [2] such as dialysis, the use of multi-dose 0.9% NaCl vials
to medicate central venous catheter insertion sites, trans-venous
endomyocardial biopsy, surgery, and active drug addiction seemed
unlikely on the ground of the results of risk analysis and the clonal
nature of the viruses found in the incident cases and the index
case. In particular, the significant association we found between
HBV infection and length of exposure to multi-patient lancing
device was unlikely to be affected by the potential increase of
hospital staying due to acute hepatitis B. In fact, estimates were
calculated according to the time a patient stayed in hospital along
the index case while susceptible (i.e. until the first HBV positive
test or the onset of acute hepatitis).
Although genotype D is the most frequent HBV genotype in Italy
[16], genetic variability of HBV is high, due to the low fidelity of
viral replication enzyme [17]. The strongest argument to support
the conclusion that the index case, 3 patients and the multi-patients
lancing device carried the same viral variant is that they constitute a
statistically significant monophyletic cluster in the phylogenetic tree
with 100% bootstrap value (obtained from 1000 replicate analysis).
The 3 cases of HBsAg sero-conversion reported during the
enhanced surveillance were considered not to be part of the
epidemic cluster either on the ground of pre-admission HBV status
or the results of molecular typing. In our opinion they should be
considered as cases of reactivation of silent HBV infection which
may occur in 4%–30% of anti-HBsAg positive subjects as the
consequence of severe immunosuppression for cytotoxic chemo-
therapy [18–19]. In fact, all these subjects underwent chemother-
apy and 2 out 3 were known to be anti-HBcAg positive at pre-
admission, while the other was proved to be infected with a
different HBV molecular variant though we had no information
about his pre-admission HBV status.
Our findings are consistent with other published studies which
emphasize that HBV, and other blood-borne pathogens, can be
transmitted by means of multi-patient lancing devices [2,5]. The
role of multi-patient lancing device in cross infection has already
been suspected in a considerable number of HBV [2–4], HCV
[20–21] and malaria [22] hospital outbreaks. In particular, due to
its high infectivity (50% minimum infectious dose as low as 10
copies) [23] and its remarkable endurance in the environment (up
to 7 days viability in dried blood) [24], HBV seem to be a top
candidate for being transmitted through blood contaminated
multi-patient lancing device; moreover a recent multicentre study
conducted in the USA showed that multi-patient lancing devices
used for capillary blood sampling in HCS may be easily
contaminated with patients’ blood [25].
The issue of HBV cross infection by means of multi-patient
lancing device in HCS is not unique to Italy. Over the last few
years similar outbreaks have occurred in other developed countries
such as the USA [3], the UK [4], Germany [26], and the
Netherlands [27]. This evidence highlights that patients undergo-
ing capillary blood sampling may face an unacceptable increased
risk for HBV whenever shared multi-patient lancing device are
used in HCS. In fact, even when the end-cap and lancet of these
devices are correctly replaced for each subsequent patient, the
lancet holder can be contaminated resulting in the exposure of
subsequent patients. Therefore we believe that multi-patient
lancing devices should be banned from HCS and replaced with
disposable safety lancets that permanently retract to prevent the
use of the same device on multiple patients, as also suggested by a
recent CDC guideline [28]. The use of non-disposable lancing
devices should be restricted to individual use at patients’ homes.
Limitations of the study are due to retrospective identification of
cases, lack of a proper screening for HBV in the hematology unit
and lack of biological specimens suitable for molecular typing for 3
out the 6 incident cases. All these issues may have potentially biased
our results in 2 opposite directions. On one hand we might have
overestimated the number of cases, as one or more of suspect cases
might actually be prevalent cases who lost anti-HBcAg/anti-HBsAg
through severe immunosuppression (false negative) and eventually
tested positive after immune reconstitution (potential misclassifica-
tion). On the other end, we might have underestimated the actual
number of cases, in fact, additional case(s) belonging to the reported
cluster or even whole additional cluster(s) might have passed
thoroughunrecognized because ofthelargenumberofpatientswith
no information about HBV status (potential misclassification).
The results of the inferential study (case-control) might be biased
because we included only patients for whom we could define the
pre-admission HBV sero-status (potential selection bias). However
this is quite unlikely as there is no reason for a systematic difference
between exposure to risk factors and availability of pre-admission
HBV sero-status. Given the small number of cases (low inferential
power) we could not carry out a multivariate analysis and define
other potential risk factor associated with the transmission.
Despite the above limitations this study provided, for the first
time, molecular evidence to relate the use of one multi-patient
lancing device to one HBV infection cluster. This evidence
strongly supports the need to remove all shared pricking devices
from HCS in order to avoid the occurrence of similar events.
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